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The 1907 white miners' strike on the Witwatersrand has often been used to
illustrate significant trends and changes in the political economy of early
twentieth-century South Africa. The principal themes are well-known. First,
the maintenance of production during the strike by African and Chinese
workers demonstrated that some of the skills of immigrant white miners could
be dispensed with, marking the beginning of a long struggle to remove white
underground workers from productive to mainly supervisory roles. Second,
a significant number of Afrikaners, introduced as strike-breakers, entered the
mining industry for the first time. This provided one element in a
convergence of interests between the industry and the new Het Volk
government, which, anxious to assist the Afrikaner unemployed who constituted
both a social threat and a section of its electoral support, requested Imperial
troops in support of its 'right to work* policy during the strike. This
indication of good faith in helping mining capital to reduce working costs
through an attack on white labour was also a signal to potential foreign
investors and lenders that the Transvaal was *safe for capital'; its government
had accepted the idea that in fostering the industry it was promoting the
state's major source of revenue and financial security, a goal to which any
competing social concern would henceforth be subordinated.
Despite being used to illuminate such important issues, no detailed
account of the 1907 strike has been published, while the few books and
articles that offer more than a bare outline of the chief events before
commenting on their significance are not always accurate. From this first
major conflict between capital and organized labour on the Rand a good deal
more can be learned than the bald summary of its outcome conventionally
rendered in statistics demonstrating reductions in working costs or an
increase in the percentage of locally-born whites employed. Such figures,
while doubtless important, contribute little towards an understanding of how
these results were achieved, and can be misleading if used to support far
tidier metanarratives about relations between state and capital than a detailed
discussion of the progress and resolution of the conflict would suggest. The
purpose of this paper is to offer a careful reconstruction of the strike that
will situate the course of events in the context of the production imperatives
of the mining industry; that will shed light on the coercive capacity of the
post-reconstruction state; that will illuminate the texture of white workers'
experience; that will permit a reading of the significance of the strike against
the background of the political history of the period; and that will above all
convey something of the magnitude of a conflict that has tended to be
diminished by being seen as the first and smallest of a series of increasingly
menacing challenges by white labour to the power of state and capital in early
twentieth-century South Africa.
When, towards the end of April 1907, the management of Knights Deep, a mine
near Germiston on the East Rand controlled by the Gold Fields group,
announced that from 1 May white stopers would have to operate three machine
drills instead of two, it was not the first occasion that miners on the Rand
had been invited to assume this additional responsibility. For nearly a year,
the companies under Wernher, Beit & Co., the leading group, had urged the
miners to accept the three-machine system. In April 1906, Ross E. Browne, an
American mining engineer, had submitted a report to Wernher, Beit &, Co. in
which he deprecated the level of efficiency of labour on the Witwatersrand.
Such inefficiency, he maintained, presented the principal obstacle to the
reduction in working costs needed to alleviate the sustained profitability crisis
in the industry; under "the most favourable conditions," the "average
efficiency of the white labour, especially in directing the coloured labour, and
of the coloured labour itself, [would] undergo radical improvement," These
conditions would not be attained by piecemeal and half-hearted measures* but
necessitated "concert of action by the representatives of the industry."
Lionel Phillips, the senior local representative of Wernher, Beit &, Co.,
looked forward to the time when capital would "be able to push the work in
the way it ought to be pushed, without bothering... much about the effect
from a political point of view." For with elections pending early in 1907, the
mineowners had been circumspect about implementing any such scheme
immediately. In October 1906, when stopers at the Crown Deep received notice
that they would have to supervise more machines, they threatened to strike
and the Manager promptly retracted the order. At other mines, however, the
transition to three-drill supervision had not been challenged to the same
extent, although on the eve of the strike it was reported that in each case
the miners had displayed resentment before the situation had been smoothed
over. While awaiting the outcome of the election, industry officials,
although taking no direct action, were tireless in "pressing the working cost
and efficiency question." Phillips and his colleague Schumacher toured
their mines, addressing the white workers "face to face (np_ reporters) in an
informal way," to remind them of their "special duty, responsibility, and
dignity" as white men. The refractory workers at the Crown Deep were told
"that it was for their own special benefit to run three machines.' At the
time of the strike, the South African Mines. Commerce and Industries, the
industry's mouthpiece, was to insist that the lesson of the conflict was that
the white miner was "beginning to fail"; only "higher efficiency" and an
"energetic sense of responsibility" would qualify him "to fill the place in the
economy of the Colony designed for him." This place, according to the
journal, was that of a "highly skilled overseer of labour," requiring the
adoption of "the necessary point of view."
A further objective of the mineowners in the months preceding the
election was to ensure that sufficient reserves of ore were developed to
maintain the recovery process should a protracted struggle materialize. For
while imported skilled miners might be dispensed with in stoping, this could
not so easily be done in development work; managers and engineers readily
exempted miners who specialized in development work from the general charge
of inefficiency. In addition to its greater skill content, this work was more
dangerous to workers1 health, and some miners avoided it where possible. The
rapid increase in the number of machine drills in use after the South African
War had added greatly to the incidence of miners1 phthisis. Silas Crowle,
giving evidence to the Mining Industry Commission, announced his intention
to abandon developing, as it was "suicide without a doubt to be developing
in those mines." Clearly an appeal to strike on grounds of health would be
sympathetically considered by these workers, who alone among the white rock-
drillers retained the capacity seriously to hinder production, if only over a
lengthy period. On many mines, then, a large quantity of ore in excess of
that stoped was blocked out in the months preceding the strike. This was
also consistent with the Randlords* policy—given a marked shortage of new
capital—of curtailing work on non-producing mines and concentrating
resources on the working mines to maximize output.
The policy of expansion on producing mines provided the context for a
further innovation that could influence the outcome of a strike: the
establishment of learners* schools underground. The idea was to broaden
the local labour market, and thereby trim wages and reduce the notoriously
high turnover rate of white rock-drillers. Although their easy hiring and
firing practices had much to do with it, industry officials had decided that
the chief cause of this turnover wag a scarcity of adequately trained white
miners. They believed that a larger supply would put a premium on
underground employment, impose greater discipline on the work-force, and
eliminate the so-called "'slacker' or 'waster* class" of worker. At the
suggestion of Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner, Phillips considered
bringing in more British miners and their families, but this he soon rejected
as politically inexpedient. Not surprisingly, therefore, the mineowners turned
to the "surplus Boer population." The learners' schools, they hoped, would
produce "efficient rock drillers" who, unlike the "jealous" immigrants, would
be prepared to train their compatriots. In time, Phillips anticipated
optimistically, a new group of workers would be formed who would not only
be less likely to join unions or strike, but whose dependence on the industry
would encourage circumspection in a future Het Volk government potentially
contemplating measures hostile to the industry. In the meantime, many of the
learners were bound to the mines for up to three years by contracts that
rendered them sufficiently vulnerable to ensure that they would remain at
their posts during a strike.
By May 1907, then, the mineowners had for some while been
implementing a strategy of production that both increased the likelihood of a
confrontation with the white miners, and was consistent with preparations for
dealing with one. The argument is not that the mineowners conspired to force
the strike. Structural pressures on the industry over a longer period were
more relevant than the short-term calculations of individual capitalists.
Certainly, the evidence confirms that magnates from at least three of the
groups debated the merits of "a stand-up fight" with the white workers.
They concluded, however, that "to carry through any drastic measures [they
would] require the active support of the Government." And of this support
they were not yet sufficiently confident, despite "private assurances of
co-operation." Against the risks of "drastic measures" they juxtaposed "the
policy of gradually weeding out inefficient men and if possible carrying on the
work" with fewer whites "without creating unnecessary difficulties or
disturbances." This was a policy that L.J, Reyersbach, the President of the
Chamber of Mines, wanted to see "pushed ahead." It was a false distinction,
for the cumulative pressures of the gradual approach were always likely, now
that electoral considerations had been removed, to cause a localized dispute
to flare into a full-grown conflict over an issue of general principle. If this
happened, Phillips argued with reference to the Knights Deep dispute, "the
time [was] not unfavourable," and the mineowners would ensure that work
would be resumed under "quite different conditions."
Capital's bare fist was thus not slow in emerging after the election. In
March, Reyersbach stated publicly that during 1906 white workers' wages had
risen while their productivity had declined, a state of affairs that could not
be allowed to continue. He acknowledged that the high cost of living on the
Rand necessitated high wages, but maintained that the mines would insist on
"obtaining efficient work" in return. Elaborating later, he contended that
there were three possible solutions: more work could be done by the same
number of men, or the same amount by fewer, with no reduction in wages; or
"the eventual alternative must be an actual reduction in the wages paid." He,
at least, was satisfied that the action of the workers at Knights Deep proved
that the last of these was the only feasible route to lowering working costs,
thus bringing declining yields within the pay limit, increasing profitability,
and attracting fresh capital from abroad.
As we have seen, the miners, while evidently dissatisfied at having to
take on three machine drills, nonetheless generally had done so after arriving
at an accommodation with management. But at Knights Deep there was to be
no compromise. Indeed, the Manager went out of his way to inflame the
dispute. Even Reyersbach conceded that he could not approve pf "the actual
handling of the beginning of the thing" by the Manager. Competing
accounts circulated of the order in which the events that precipitated the
conflict occurred. All sources agreed that the stopers at Knights Deep were
notified that they were to supervise three machines, and that the price per
fathom would be cut from 70s. to 60s. The differences concerned the timing
of the introduction of these changes. One version asserted that they were
announced simultaneously, apologists for the new conditions adding
disingenuously that the extra machine was allocated to enable the miners to
break sufficient rock to recover or even exceed the reduction in pay.
Another version suggested that the order to operate three drills preceded the
notice of the new rates, which then "intensified the situation." This would
appear to be more consistent with the conduct of the Manager in the dispute.
The instruction to supervise three machines angered the workers, and
a number vowed to defy it. M. Trewick, the General Secretary of the
Transvaal Miners' Association {TMA), had come out from Johannesburg to
discuss the issue with the miners, A meeting of the local branch of the union
on Sunday 28 April had been poorly attended, however, resulting only in a
condemnation of the three-machine system. A decision to strike would not
lightly be taken by the miners, many of whom feared being replaced in the
current depression. Still hoping that a compromise could be reached, a
meeting at the shaft the following Tuesday morning resolved to appoint a
deputation to see the Manager, who peremptorily refused to consider the men's
objections, adding that it would be pointless for them to appeal over his head
to the directors as he "had plenipotentiary powers to deal with the matter."
It was at this point, according to the second version, that the proposed
reduction in pay was communicated to the workers, who did not have long to
wait to experience the Manager's "powers," it being soon thereafter reported
that two members of the deputation had been dismissed.
A strike now seemed increasingly likely, and already miners were saying
that two further properties controlled by the Gold Fields group would be
implicated in the dispute: the Simmer and Jack Bast, under joint management
with Knights Deep; and the Robinson Deep, where an altercation over contract
prices was in progress. A notice was circulating warning miners that a strike
was pending at Knights Deep. The final decision, however, was not taken
until early the following morning, 1 May, at a meeting at the shaft of the day
and night shifts. But even at this gathering the miners hesitated, opting to
appeal one last time to the Manager, who spurned their overtures, stating that
they should accept the new conditions or "leave their work." Only at this
point, and after a further meeting, did the men resolve to strike, the day
shift then returning to their quarters.
From the first there were intimations of the formidable conflict to come.
The Manager took "energetic measures" to ensure that production continued.
He immediately found five men to go down the mine in place of the morning
shift. The miners did not intervene, but when they learned later that further
replacements were being brought out from Johannesburg for the afternoon
shift a number of workers collected to await their arrival. When the
replacements appeared, the miners attempted to persuade them not to act as
strike-breakers. One of the recruits then displayed a revolver and a scuffle
ensued in which the man was knocked down. A police patrol arrived soon
after and dispersed the crowd. Four policemen were posted on the mine
overnight, but this did not dissuade some 60 or 70 strikers from turning out
at 6.30 the next morning on picket duty. The Manager ordered the men off
the property, telling them they had been dismissed. The miners refused and,
after a sharp exchange of words with a prominent TMA member, the Manager
apparently drew a revolver, pocketing it again when challenged to use his
fists instead. The constables eventually broke up the fight, the property was
cleared, and thirty mounted police were called in to prevent further incidents.
That afternoon six men went down the mine and an additional fourteen arrived
to replace the strikers. The Manager conceded that the strike had caused
some inconvenience, but added: ".. . in a few days... with police protection we
hope to replace all the strikers, and the trouble will fizzle out."
The Manager was not incorrect in assuming that the police would
provide protection; the next day, 3 May, twelve constables and two sergeants
from Johannesburg were seconded to the Germiston division of the Transvaal
Town Police. He was to be quite wrong, however, in his estimation of the
duration of the conflict. This miscalculation can be ascribed to the almost
universal refusal of industry officials to acknowledge that the white miners
had legitimate grievances. Few images were more readily adduced to support
the charge of inefficiency than that of the extravagantly paid, indolent
supervisor who sat on his box smoking a pipe while the African or Chinese
workers under him did all the hard work. Indeed, so assiduously was this
image propagated in the press that one of the strike-breakers, under the
impression that it was his prerogative, sat down to watch, the workers in his
charge and was instantly dismissed by the mine captain. The President of
the Chamber argued that the miners' reasons for striking would be shown to
be "rather sentimental than real." And few mineowners could resist the
observation that, in the words of one, the strike was "an artificial one put up
by half-a-dozen agitators." The Governor, too, expressed incomprehension,
stating that the "strangest feature" of the strike, one "never yet... manifested
in the industrial world," was that "none" of the strikers was earning less
than £20 a month while some were paid up to £200.
With such pervasively disseminated views to oppose, the miners lost
little time in formulating their own arguments, most of which had been clearly
articulated by 6 May, when the strike first spread beyond Knights Deep.
While it is true that miners on the contract system could earn good wages,
many, after the cost of 'unskilled' labour and stores had been deducted from
their pay, came out with very little, or even in debt. The question of
wages was inseparable from the even more pressing issue of health. One
investigation into the causes of death of Cornish miners had already
ascertained that Cornishmen who had operated rock drills in the Transvaal
died at the average age of 36.4 years, having worked an average of 4.7 years
at the rock face. Three drills meant greater exposure to the lethal dust
responsible for miners* phthisis. On the first day of the strike the workers
circulated a handbill emphasizing precisely this danger: "The Life of a Miner
on two Machines is from five to seven years. If he takes three Machines it
will be from three to five years..." Figures such as these understandably
led the miners to the conclusion that they were entitled to high wages. "We
don't live very long," said one, "and I don't think we are overpaid. We are
practically giving our lives under present conditions." When, on Saturday
4 May, a deputation from the Knights Deep miners met the Minister of Mines,
Jacob de Villiers, they placed health concerns at the head of their list of
grievances. The Minister was asked to amend the mining regulations to
specify that one miner could not control more than two machines.
Other arguments and demands put forward at this meeting would also
frequently be reiterated in the coming months. First, if no restriction was
placed on the number of machines or hand-drillers that a white miner had to
oversee, the work would effectively pass into the hands of his African and
Chinese counterparts, resulting in a decrease both in wages and in the
number of whites employed. This was an argument repeatedly resorted to by
the miners at their public meetings and at subsequent interviews with a
government that was thought to be sympathetic towards a white labour policy
in the mining industry. And the white community on the Rand, experiencing
the ravages of depression, could be expected to identify with the miners' claim
that the magnates' machinations undermined efforts to create conditions that
permitted the workers to feel sufficiently secure to settle permanently in the
Transvaal. Thus, one of the Knights Deep strikers was to declare at a public
meeting that the miners were "fighting the battle of white civilisation in South
Africa."
The miners also told de Villiers that the additional responsibilities
expected of the white miners would render strict observation of the
regulations impossible, particularly those pertaining to the handling of
explosives. The deputation wished to see an end to the insufficiently
regulated system of issuing blasting certificates, and requested stricter
enforcement of the existing blasting regulations by the Mines Department,
Finally, the miners asked for arbitration machinery with the power to settle
disputes. In his response, de Villiers was non-committal. The government, he
said, "intended to see that justice was done to all sections and classes of the
community." He sympathized with the men's desire for healthier working
conditions, stating that a Commission was about to consider sucjb matters, and
that this would be the appropriate venue to argue their case.
Such advice was unlikely to appease the miners confronted with a lock-
out at Knights Deep. In the event, the final report of the Mining Regulations
Commission was published only in 1910, while the contemporaneously appointed
Mining Industry Commission, whose recommendations were ignored by the
government, did not report until March 1908. Meanwhile, the mineowners were
displaying few indications that they intended shelving their plans for
reorganizing underground work until these Commissions had completed their
work. The next evening, 5 May, rock-drillers on contract at the Simmer and
Jack East met the Manager to secure an assurance that he would not
introduce the three-machine system at the mine, but, despite the workers1
offer to accept a reduction in pay if the question were dropped, the Manager
refused to discuss the matter. A meeting of the miners then resolved to
strike in sympathy with the men at Knights Deep, although only after a
protracted discussion which revealed a reluctance to strike among the men on
day's pa.v, the "sixteen and eights(" many of whom were married and had few
savings. Indeed, a concert had been held in Germiston the evening before
to raise money to assist the married miners of Knights Deep and their families.
But all miners were liable to suffer hardship if unemployed for even a short
time. One TMA official later estimated that half the miners (younger, single
men prominent among them) required assistance from the union within the
first two weeks of having struck work.
Most traumatic of all was the threat that the mines would use the 24
hours' notice clauses in the workers' contracts to evict them from their rooms
and houses. With so many dependent on mine accommodation, this threat was
always a powerful deterrent to strike action. As William Hallimond, Manager
of the Crown Deep, put it, the clause was "meant for the class of man who
misbehaves himself." Thus, when the miners at the Simmer and Jack East
joined the strike on Monday 6 May, they were ordered to vacate their rooms
at once; several who boarded up their houses were ousted by the police.
Similar orders were ruthlessly enforced at one mine after another in the
following weeks as managers sought to corrode the miners' morale. In some
instances, workers* furniture and belongings were dumped outside their rooms
as they searched frantically for alternative quarters.
The rumble of wagons transporting furniture through the streets of
Germiston thus became a familiar sound to the town's residents as the strike
spread to other mines on the East Rand. By Wednesday 8 May over 1,000
miners in this area alone had downed tools. The previous day had seen the
strike extend both to the Robinson Deep on the central Rand and to mines
other than those controlled by Consolidated Gold Fields. By Saturday 11 May
1,400 workers from ten mines had joined the strike. At this stage, the
miners were reasonably confident of success. Committees at each mine
organized strong pickets, strikers' meetings were held twice a day, and
although the bars in Germiston and Boksburg were doing a brisk business,
there was very little drunkenness. Groups of strikers visited the mines
where the three-drill system was in operation to persuade fellow workers to
join their ranks.
The rapid spread of the dispute was causing considerable anxiety in a
number of circles, and during the second week more than one attempt was
made by third parties to end it. On 8 May, clergymen from the Germiston
area met miners' delegates and promised their assistance. Local tradespeople,
already squeezed by the depression, feared a protracted withdrawal of the
miners' purchasing capacity. They could also be a vehicle of capital's
pressure on the miners; during the strike, at least one tradesman received an
instruction from his backers to stop all credit on mines where workers had
struck. Lost custom and reduced turnover appeared inevitable, and on 9 May
a deputation from the Germiston Chamber of Commerce appealed to the
President of the Chamber of Mines to use his influence to end the dispute.
Reyersbach refused, stating that his Chamber had no mandate to intervene in
a matter affecting individual employers and their workers, thus prefiguring
his remarkable assertion a week later that the Chamber was "not in any sense
an association of employers." Unofficially, the Germiston Chamber was told
that the mineowners intended "to bring the men to their knees."
The Acting Commissioner of Police, Lieu tenant-Colonel C.R.M. O'Brien, had
also followed developments closely. Now 47, he had joined the Transvaal Town
Police at its inception in May 1901. Having spent many years in the army,
including a period in India, he had been President of the Military Tribunal
during the South African War, and had forgone the possibility of commanding
his regiment in the hope that he would eventually become Commissioner of
Police. Acting Commissioner since the beginning of 1907, and serving a
government determined to effect swingeing retrenchments in the civil service
as a whole, and to streamline the Colony's elaborate policing arrangements in
particular, it is possible that he saw in the strike his last opportunity to
stake a claim to the most senior position.
The spread of the dispute had very quickly overextended the Town
Police. By 7 May, 65 constables and non-commissioned officers, nearly half of
them mounted, had been assigned to strike duty on the mines, and no more,
in O'Brien's opinion, could "be spared with any safety" from normal duties.
The day before, he had discussed the situation with de Villiers, who had
authorized him if necessary to call on the South African Constabulary (SAC).
Now, with more mines joining the strike, he requested Colonel Curtis, the
Inspector-General of the SAC, to send 30 men and an officer to Germiston.
On 8 May, all police leave was suspended and trainees were placed in uniform.
Curtis was asked to provide further Constabulary to be held in reserve at
Auckland Park, and two officers and 75 constables (50 of whom were mounted)
arrived the following day from Potchefstroom. While acknowledging that the
strikers were "as a body well behaved," O'Brien maintained that these
preparations were necessary "in case of the strikes developing i^f°
lawlessness," which he considered Ukely "when so many men [were] idle."
When the first serious incidents of violence occurred in mid-May,
however, idleness was the most marginal of causes. Several more convincing
reasons can be advanced to account for the strikers' growing anger. First,
as their movement spread to the central Rand, it began to lose momentum.
Workers in this part of the Reef were hesitant to commit themselves, despite
large demonstrations of strikers on these properties. Miners would refuse to
go on shift one day and be back at work the next. In some instances secret
8ballots were held resulting in decisions not to strike. From about 12 May,
rank and file criticism of the way in which the strike was being conducted by
the TMA became more pronounced. Meetings of miners still at work revealed
that, although sympathetic to the strike, they felt that it was so poorly
organized that it was bound to fail. Production, they argued, did not appear
to be seriously affected; the strike had been started at the wrong time, and
without adequate preparation! and only a general strike of all the miners on
the Rand would be effective.
On its own, this rank-and-file hesitation was unlikely to produce
widespread violence. It was the formulation by the state of a coherent policy
for dealing with the strike, combined with a determined effort by the
Randlords to replace the miners by recruiting strike-breakers on a large
scale, that impelled the strikers beyond methods of peaceful persuasion. On
13 May, Reyersbach led a deputation of mineowners to de Villiers to request
"adequate police protection" for strike-breakers. The Minister "promised to
do all in his power," thus confirming assurances given individually to
employers the week before. The same morning, de Villiers instructed
O'Brien to station twelve constables on each affected mine "to afford
protection to men willing to work and ... to stop intimidation." He also told
O'Brien to call on all available members of the SAC, even though many would
have to come from as far away as Swaziland. That afternoon, O'Brien drew
the attention of his officers to the legal apparatus at their disposal, including
Law 6 of 1894, which would later be invoked to disperse assemblies on the
mines. Meanwhile, on many properties, management was erecting tall
corrugated iron fences to prevent the miners on strike from communicating
with strike-breakers. Recruiters—encouraged and assisted by notables close
to the Cabinet, such as the industrialist Samuel Marks, and Dr Engelenburg
of De Volkstem—were actively at work in Pretoria, Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom,
and the Orange River Colony signing up the Afrikaners who would be
quartered behind these barricades.
In the context of concerted efforts by the strikers to impart fresh
momentum to their movement, it is hardly surprising that violence should
swiftly have succeeded these measures by state and industry. Tndeed, a
reporter from the Rand Daily Mail had been struck by the demeanour of the
Fordsburg and Langlaagte miners before energetic steps had been taken to
replace them, their having employed "no other means further than talking the
would-be blacklegs over, and in many instances paying their fares back to
where they came from, over and above giving many of them a good square
meal." In Germiston, the "first show of force" was occasioned by the
arrival of a consignment of strike-breakers on 13 May. Here too the local
strike committee had followed a policy of helping those who had been
persuaded not to act as strike-breakers to return home. And they did not
have to work hard on a number of Afrikaners recruited with promises of far
better wages than they were offered on their arrival at the mines. For
those strike-breakers and miners still at work who resided permanently on the
Rand, the TMA reserved the tactic of publishing lists of their names.
By mid-May, however, their places being quickly filled, the miners began
to lose patience. At Germiston station on 13 and 15 May, large crowds of
workers gathered to meet trains arriving with strike-breakers from
Krugersdorp and Pretoria. In the first incident, they rushed the platform,
chasing the new arrivals; those offering resistance were "severely handled."
In the second, police prevented a crowd of 500 miners from entering the
station. The strike-breakers were put in cabs to take them to the Rose Deep.
The convoy reached the mine,m but only after the miners had stoned the cabs
and the police. Some 200 strikers later made for the nearby Simmer and Jack
East, where they showered stones on the workers' quarters and attempted to
break down the barricades before being dispersed by the police.
The same day, a rumour that between 50 and 60 strike-breakers were
on their way from Pretoria to Braamfontein station to replace miners on the
central Rand brought groups of strikers out onto the Main Reef Road at
different points between the Robinson mine and the Langlaagte Deep. Several
hundred, many with cycles and armed with sticks, later assembled in
Fordsburg before congregating on the Main Reef Road with the appearance,
in the words of one witness, "of a determined and dangerous lot of men."
When the two wagons of strike-breakers, escorted by 40 mounted police, were
spotted on their way through Fordsburg, they were immediately pursued by
crowds of strikers hurling abuse and stones. Thinking that all the men were
headed for the Langlaagte Deep, the miners had not taken the precaution of
stationing lookouts near the Crown Deep, where the convoy succeeded in
introducing approximately half the strike-breakers without hindrance. Not
long after the police had left the Crown Deep with the remainder, however,
they were met by some 300 or 400 strikers. Major MacGregor, the officer in
charge, led the escort through the crowd of workers, ordering them off the
road and to put down their sticks. This only angered the miners further, and
from this point to the entrance of the Langlaagte Deep, they hurled stones,
sticks and anything else within reach at the convoy. Repeated attempts were
made to drag the strike-breakers off the wagons. Having placed their
charges beyond the barricades, MacGregor and his men departed, and the
infuriated miners prepared to rush the fencing. Their attention was
distracted from doing so, however, by the arrival of a wagon containing
bedding for the strike-breakers. After unloading the wagon, the crowd set
its contents alight, the few remaining constables not daring to ^intervene.
No further incidents on this scale took place during the week that
followed. However, assaults on individual strike-breakers by small bands of
miners became widespread. In one of the most serious, a man named Botha
was nearly beaten to death by a group of forty strikers. Everything now
pointed to an escalation of the struggle. The TMA, stung, on the one hand,
by the criticism of its organization of the strike levelled at it by miners who
had refused to join the movement, and propelled forward, on the other, by the
militancy of those already on strike, was rapidly being forced to consider
calling a general strike of all underground workers. The strike could not be
terminated without alienating the miners who had already been paid off (1,288
on 15 May, according to Reyersbach) ; nor could it be continued on a mine
by mine basis as before if the TMA wished to overcome rank-and-file
hesitation and thus successfully extend the movement.
On 14 May, it was reported that Trewick of the TMA—in pursuit of a
speedy end to the struggle—had written to his counterpart in the South
African Engine Drivers* and Firemen's Association (SAEDFA), Peter Whiteside,
a Labour Member of the Legislative Assembly, asking the engine drivers to
join the miners. The engine drivers, it was generally acknowledged, "held the
key of the situation," "the number of certificated engine drivers capable
running hoisting engines" being "very little in excess of the demand."
Whiteside, though patently unenthusiastic, could hardly spurn the miners
publicly, and thus sought to delay committing his union one way or the other
for as long as possible. On 15 May, he led a deputation of his union to de
Villiers to request the government to appoint an arbitration court, but was
told that this could only be done if both parties to the dispute agreed. The
next day, therefore, the deputation took the same proposal to a meeting with
the mineownerSv who stated that in their opinion "there was nothing to
arbitrate upon."
This refusal of arbitration enabled the TMA to pose the question of a
general strike in a way that would reconcile the various demands being placed
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on it. A meeting in Germiston that evening decided, first, that the miners
would return to work under the old conditions while an arbitration court sat,
provided no-one was victimized for his part in the strike; and, second, that
there would be a general strike if the mineowners refused arbitration. On
Sunday 19 May, delegates from 27 mines met at Trades Hall in Johannesburg
to discuss the recommendation of the TMA's Executive Committee that as the
Chamber of Mines could settle the question if they wished, "their refusal of
arbitration [would] at last justify the men in going the whole hog." The
meeting resolved to call a general strike against supervising three machine
drills or more than 25 hand-drillers, to begin on Wednesday 22 May on all
producing mines affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, thus exempting those
controlled by J.B. Robinson, who had assured the TMA that the three-machine
question would "never be raised on his mines." All miners who disobeyed the
call would be considered "blacklegs," and their names and birthplaces
advertised. Strike leaders felt confident that those who had refused to join
the movement on the grounds that it was poorly organized now had "no
alternative left but to come out."
The government meanwhile was reinforcing its coercive powers to meet
any intensification of the conflict. Ministers became more open about
affording protection to the strike-breakers. Immediately after receiving the
engine drivers on 15 May, de Villiers delivered an important speech at a
luncheon of the Agricultural Society. "I feel," he declared, reflecting the
concerns of the wealthy rural supporters of Het Volk, "if our mining industry
does not progress and does not go on, agriculture must necessarily also be
at a standstill." The government, he continued, did not wish "to figure as
partisans on one side or the other." As he warmed to his theme, however, it
became clear that the miners would draw little comfort from his words:
"[The government] regrets immensely to see some of the scenes of riot
and disorder which have taken place. We cannot sit still and see people
intimidated... [I]t is the sacred right of every individual to work
wherever he likes and whenever he likes, and no man should be
disturbed in that right. The Government will see that no one is
intimidated in this country."
As he spoke, the Northern Rifle Volunteers, on orders from the Acting. Prime
Minister, J.C. Smuts, were preparing to mobilize at an hour's notice. The
next day, O'Brien reported that he had arranged with the mining houses to
transport strike-breakers to the mines along the coal lines rather than by
scheduled trains. He instructed his officers to counter "any further rioting"
with "strenuous efforts to niake arrests of the ringleaders in order that they
may be made an example of." They were also empowered to swear in special
constables "vouched for by a responsible person (such as Manager of Mine)
as discreet and proper persons" to be employed in "safe guarding of the life
and property on which they reside [sic]." Managers were advised to station
African mine police at "such vulnerable sites as magazines."
Managers were not slow in taking advantage of these measures. By 17
May, over 100 special constables had been enrolled on the Simmer and Jack
alone. In all, between 1,500 and .2)000 would be employed across the Reef
during the course of the strike. Most were drawn from amongst the
surface workers, for by now few categories of underground worker were
unrepresented among the strikers* Although suddenly thought to be
"generally of greater intelligence" than the underground workers, the
surface workers' reliability had more to do with their vulnerability to
dismissal and eviction. After the South African War, a large number of
artisans had come to the Transvaal believing that rapid development would
take place and that work would be readily available. Now, with work on non-
producing mines curtailed, many roamed the Rand in search of employment,
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and had begun to organize themselves, causing disquiet in ruling circles.
Henry Hay, Manager of the Witwatersrand Deep, told the Transvaal Indigency
Commission in June 1907 that there was "a surplus of surface labour..* there
[were] far more carpenters, smiths, and fitters than [could] get work." One
of the miners on strike argued that the surface workers "have to do what
they are told, or face ruin. They dare not refuse. If they did, there are 20
men who would offer to take each vacant job." Surface workers had tended
to settle on the Rand with their families, and many occupied married quarterns
on the mines, making them doubly reluctant to join in the miners' struggle.
While surface workers were being sworn in as special constables on the
weekend preceding 22 May, the day the general strike was to begin, O'Brien
was pressing Colonel Curtis to provide him with a reserve of at least 100
additional South African Constabulary. Saturday and Monday being holidays,
he was expecting trouble. The Manager of the Roodepoort United Main Reef,
meanwhile, reassured perhaps by the government's public commitments to
upholding 'law and order,' and by the TMA's neglect of the area, chose this
moment to announce new conditions of employment*..thus ensuring the spread
of the strike to the West Rand for the first time. By the afternoon of 20
May, workers were meeting at mines across the Rand to discuss the call for
a general strike. The managers assured O'Brien that many mines would not
be affected by the call if the workers could be sure of receiving "adequate
protection." While miners at some properties were certainly cautious about
joining the movement, others were now satisfied with the TMA's change of
tactics. That evening, for example, a "quite spontaneous" private meeting of
miners at the Meyer and Charlton voted in favour of strike action, despite the
fact that on this mine each white miner supervised only two machines and an
average of 20 hand-drillers. They resolved to strike in support ol "the
principle of tfnity," for if the movement failed all would "suffer alike."
The extension of the strike on 22 May rapidly drained O'Brien's reserve
of Constabulary. The arrival that morning of a contingent of the SAC Special
Burgher Police, a force originally raised from farmers and former Republican
police in and around the Witwatersrand to capture Chinese deserters, did little
to allay his concern. Magistrates in 11 rural districts were told that the
SAC in their areas had been withdrawn and that they should, if necessary,
swear in special constables. It was evident by now, however, that there
would never be sufficient police to cope with a strike across the 50 miles of
the Rand. O'Brien was "strongly of opinion" that unless there was "a
considerable demonstration of force throughout the whole Rand," it would "be
difficult to keep the men who [were] desirous of working at their work..."
For this he wanted at least another 500 men in addition to the 550 police
already on strike duty. O'Brien advised against calling out the Volunteers,
however, "a large proportion of whom [were] likely to be in sympathy with the
strikers."80
The miners, believing that the general strike call had put their house
in order, now felt justified in taking all necessary steps to secure the
allegiance of waverers. Greatest support came from the East Rand, where the
movement had started. Here, joint marches of strikers and the unemployed
paraded past the mines to well-attended meetings. In the central area, where
workers on a number of mines still intended going on shift, large crowds of
strikers surrounded shafts and boarding-houses to ensure that they could
not. In one incident at the Robinson Mine that evening, 500 men assembled
to prevent the night shift from going down, tearing down the corrugated iron
fencing around the shafts. By late the next afternoon, 23 May, 48 mines were
affected, and a very large demonstration of miners and onlookers had
convinced workers at the Ferreira Deep to go on strike. This crowd,
numbering 1,500, then marched to the Robinson Deep, broke down the
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barricade, and wrecked the boarding-house. Shots were fired and several
constables were severely beaten before the crowd was dispersed with hoses
turned on at full pressure. To the reporter of the South African News, there
appeared to be "every probability of all the regular underground men from
Krugersdorp to Springs being forced out."
The government, heeding O'Brien's advice, applied to the Governor for
the use of Imperial troops stationed in the Transvaal. Selborne consented at
once. An astonished Colonial Office official, receiving Selborne's telegram on
24 May, by which time 200 mounted troops and 500 infantry had already taken
up positions along the Reef, remarked that it would be difficult for the British
government to veto this unprecedented move from such a distance, especially
when the Governor had been convinced that it was "absolutely necessary."
"The prevention of disturbance," he continued, "is the most elementary
function of government, and the assignment of this duty to forces not subject
to the orders of Ministers is really inconsistent with self-government."
Churchill, however, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, was
captivated by the ironies of the situation:
"This is a growing cloud, and I wish we knew more about it. Fancy
what a mixture of British [...?] prejudices and antagonisms. A Boer
Government, ordering British cavalry, with the approval of a Liberal
Ministry, to charge British strikers and protect Dutch blacklegs in the
interests of Rand magnates! On the whole I am inclined to approve. We
promised to help Botha and I think we should stand by him and his
government. I think Parliament will take or at least accept this
view."82
Within a few days, as the number of cavalry was increased to 910, making a
total of 1,410 troops in addition to the SAC, Town Police, and Burgher Police,
the Rand had become "an armed camp." Mine recreation halls were turned
into barracks, the Main Reef Road was studded with patrols, and all
approaches to shafts and mine quarters were guarded.
O'Brien had lost no time in pressing his reinforcements into service.
On the morning of 24 May, he drew up a police notice, quickly approved by
de Villiers, in terms of Law 6 of 1894, prohibiting "all assemblies of Six or
more persons within a radius of 300 yards of any Mine-headgear, Machinery,
Building, Dwelling or Premises attached..." Three thousand copies were
conspicuously, posted on all mines, on roads approaching mines, and in
working-class suburbs. One was specifically delivered to the strike
headquarters of the Fordsburg miners at the Tramway Hotel, where a plain
clothes policeman had been observing the strikers' movements since 20 May.
From the Tramway, on the boundary of the suburb, miners had been able "to
make a sudden rush on any of the mines in the vicinity." Officers were
"strictly enjoined" to enforce the notice, and to ensure that they had
"sufficient force on the spot" to do so. With the troops now on hand for this
purpose, O'Brien thought it was "quite time that the mob should be shown
that violence [could not] be tolerated."
That afternoon, two episodes altered the course of the strike. The first
took place at the Geldenhuis Deep, the only important mine in the Germiston
district that had not yet joined the strike. On their way there, a large
column of strikers passed the site where 50 Cameron Highlanders were camped
in time to see the latter march off. The miners cheerfully greeted the
soldiers with calls of "good old Camerons." When an equal number of the
Queen's Bays rode by a short time after, they extended similar praise. Their
mood changed, however, as they neared the Geldenhuis Deep, where they
found the path blocked, first by the Bays, then by a second line of mounted
police under Inspector Samson, and, finally, by the Cameron Highlanders. A
further 50 Camerons were posted at an entrance facing towards Johannesburg,
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from which direction a second column of miners was approaching. As the
second column neared, Lieutenant Heathcote, commanding the infantry, ordered
his men to fix bayonets. This angered the miners, who turned round to join
the men from Germiston. Inspector Samson then came forward and ordered
the strikers to disperse in terms of Law 6. Interrupted by caustic comments
about British freedoms, he warned that he would break up any meeting with
violence. With many in this crowd of 700 determined to retaliate, calm was
preserved only by permitting a party of six to speak to the Geldenhuis Deep
miners. When the delegates later returned with news that the latter would
join the strike, the miners1 columns re-formed to return.
The second episode did issue in violence. Workers meeting at the
Tramway Hotel in Fordsburg had marched to the Consolidated Langlaagte. A
few mounted police just managed to insert themselves between the entrance
and the crowd, which now numbered several hundred. Not long after, some
Constabulary arrived on foot to support them. Fearing that the mine would
be rushed, Superintendent Miller allowed a deputation of six through the fence
to see the Manager. At this point, Colonel O*Brien appeared on horseback,
having ordered 50 of the Queen's Bays to follow him. There are conflicting
accounts of what happened next. O'Brien and his subordinates later reported
that the crowd was violent, openly threatening the police and preparing to
rush the fence armed with sticks. At least one man had drawn a revolver
from his pocket, many had been drinking heavily, and there was "a
considerable number of foreigners," who were "dangerous persons... ready to
proceed to extremities." In O'Brien's opinion, this was "certainly the most
threatening exhibition throughout the strike trouble and a salutary effect was
needed." Strike leaders, on the other hand, contended that the gathering
had been quietly awaiting the return of the deputation. Whichever version
is correct, when the Queen's Bays arrived, O'Brien sounded a trumpet and
called on the crowd to disperse in terms of Law 6. When the men did not
comply, O'Brien ordered the Bays to charge the crowd, which they did with
swords drawn, scattering the miners in all directions. R.J. Stickland,
identified as a leader, was arrested and warned by O'Brien before being
released. Before long he would be giving "secret assistance" to the police.
The effect on the miners* morale of the two incidents on Friday 24 May
was dramatic. As we have seen, some attempts were made to fraternize with
the soldiers. When the troops had arrived on the East Rand on the evening
of 23 May, it was said that many strikers had friends among them. Archie
Crawford, of the Independent Labour Party, addressing a meeting of the
unemployed and the miners, drew cheers when he said that "the time was
coming when the soldiers and police, if ordered to fire on their fellow-
workers, would drop their arms and refuse." After 24 May, the miners
debated wearing their medals "gained in the service of the Empire" to remind
the troops that the strikers "were fellow-workers and their own flesh and
blood." The idea was rejected, however, for fear of offending the Afrikaner
strike-breakers, to whom the TMA had appealed for support as "fellow South
Africans.' The miners made little progress on either front. Early the
following week, O'Brien reported that "the arrival of [the] troops in such
numbers [had] had good effect," and that his men were escorting strike-
breakers to the mines unopposed. Strike leaders admitted cancelling
demonstrations because the miners were "all frightened of the soldiers and
police." When a deputation met Botha and de Villiers on Saturday 1 June,
Lieutenant Heathcote and Colonel O'Brien were bitterly criticized. Trewick
considered it "a disgrace" that "in a country under the British flag" bayonets
had been pointed "at the breasts of British subjects." Thomas Willis, the TMA
President, stated that after O'Brien's charge miners who had been present had
come to him "white" with shock. Such behaviour by the authorities, the
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deputation contended, was "directly inciting to rebellion."
In his response, the Prime Minister, who had returned two days
previously from attending the Colonial Conference in London, attempted to
persuade the deputation that the use of the troops was "not a movement
against the miners." Referring to incidents ia the past in which Chinese
deserters had assaulted and murdered whites , he argued that with the
miners on strike there was "no protection against the Chinese":
"If the Mine Manager says: 'Assist me here,1 he will get the miners to
assist him, but when they have gone there is no protection. Supposing
then theoChinese had come out and murdered 500 or 600 people in one
night, who would have the blame?"
Moreover, there were "always a lot of scoundrels of white men in the country"
who, in the present crisis, could "get opportunities for working their
schemes." The soldiers, Botha concluded, "are there to protect you as well
as anybody else. As I said before, if anything should go wrong there the
people would blame you and that we want to prevent." This profession of
solicitude for the TMA's public image was not the first occasion that the
canard of the Chinese threat had been exploited to justify the deployment of
troops on the Rand. The press had widely publicized Churchill's statement in
the Commons on 27 May that "the presence of 50,000 Chinese on the Rand was
an element which added to the general insecurity of the country and which
justified the High Commissioner in affording additional assistance." A similar
declaration by Smuts was also reported.
But what role did the Chinese, and indeed the 93,000 African, workers
play during the strike? Officials concluded that the African workers had
viewed the conflict with "supreme indifference." The response of the
Chinese miners, howeyer, had initially caused concern in ruling circles. At
the start of the strike, the TMA had claimed that the Chinese would "come out
in support of the men-" The correspondent of the South African News
reported that Chinese miners at the Simmer and Jack East had expressed an
unwillingness "to wqrk for any new men who were sent down the mine."
Another journalist observed "many attempts on the part of the strikers to
explain the position to the coolies with the evident intention of gaining
sympathy if not support." On 8 May, the issue drew a stern leader from
the Rand Daily Mail:
"A strike among the Chinese, instigated by the miners, might lead to
riots and outrages of a nature which we are confident the miners
themselves could never for one moment countenance. It is a disgrace
to civilization if two bodies of white men, between whom there exists a
difference of opinion, cannot settle, those differences without calling in
the assistance of Chinese coolies."
That the Chinese had only to continue working to assist one side did not
matter to this commentator. After this date, however, there were no further
reports of the white miners' involving the Chinese workers in their struggle.
The Chinese, of course, had no reason to participate in the conflict. More
closely policed even than the African workers, not least, as Botha noted, by
the white miners themselves, they had developed their own forms of
resistance. African workers were equally unlikely to support the
movement; although miners' phthisis also killed large numbers of Africans, this
was seldom considered by the white workers.
There is ample evidence to suggest that the experience and skill
required to carry on the work in the absence of the white miners was
provided by their African and Chinese counterparts. Although the Mines
Department's inspectors denied that African and Chinese workers, and
uncertificated whites, had infringed the regulations by conducting blasting
operations, describing the evidence as "conflicting," the observation of an
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official in the Colonial Office that this denial amounted to "not guilty, but
don't do it again," was certainly more accurate. On 28 May, at the
greatest extent of the strike, only 455 stamps out of 5,095 on the affected
mines were hung up, 360 of these being on the East Rand Proprietary Mines.
Development work on most mines was suspended—made possible by the large
reserves of ore opened up prior to the strike—and all available resources
were concentrated in the stopes to keep the mills supplied. Many of the
Afrikaner strike-breakers were put in charge of tramming and other unskilled
underground work; George Farrar, a principal mineowner and Leader of the
Opposition in the Assembly, considered those "accustomed to farm life" to be
the "most suitable." Learners, mine captains, shift bosses and others,
including surface workers, oversaw stoping.
With output thus maintained, and effective picketing prevented, some of
the miners returned to work. On 25 May there had been 4,171 men on strike;
by 31 May there were 3,768. The groups laid down harsh new conditions
before taking back workers. Towards the end of May, at meetings of
consulting engineers and managers, William Lincoln Honnold of Consolidated
Mines Selection appraised the industry's position. He drew two conclusions:
first, current grades of ore dictated an immediate fall in working costs;
second, because yields would decline still further, a context had to be created
in which costs could be reduced progressively in the future. The strike put
both goals within reach. Lower rates of pay could be set across the industry
to achieve the first, but Honnold was vaguer on the second, insisting only
that "a radical reconstruction of [the] system of labour organisation" was
required. For the miners, though, the consequences were inescapable: they
would have to work "without tacit or implied limitations as to the scope of
their activities." Robert Raine, Manager of Village Main Reef, later elaborated:
"The men have come back to work, and they ask, 'What are the
conditions?' I say, 'The conditions are these. You have to do what you
are told. If I want you to work two or four or ten machines then it is
for me to find out the efficiency, not for you.'"
This also meant no unions, for the mines had to "be free to make the most of
[their] labour conditions." Trade unionism, argued Honnold, was the "main
issue" of the strike; to prevail on this question justified "any temporary
sacrifice" by the industry.
Not all the miners, however, were prepared to return to work on such
terms. On 10 June, 3,000 were still on strike, while at the beginning of July
O'Brien calculated the number at 1,647. The miners who remained out first
placed their hopes on the engine drivers' joining the strike. The cautious
Whiteside eventually announced on Saturday 25 May that the members of his
union would be balloted the following week. By then, however, the effect of
the troops on the course of the strike had become perfectly dear, and the
engine drivers voted by five to one against supporting the TMA. The TMA
still hoped to persuade the government to intervene with some form of
compulsory arbitration; the deputation to the Prime Minister on 1 June
presented a petition, signed by 3,271 miners, requesting the appointment of
an arbitration court to settle the dispute. Botha replied that there was no
statute that the government could invoke to impose a settlement. Like de
Villiers on previous occasions, he argued that legislation would have to await
the Commissions' reports, and Jthat the government could only mediate if both
sides agreed to such a step.
Botha nonetheless wrote to Reyersbach after seeing the miners'
delegates to ask whether there was any possibility of the Chamber's settling
with the strikers. The mineowners in turn sent a deputation to see Botha
and de Villiers on Friday 7 June. At this meeting, they reiterated their
objections to arbitration, Farrar stating bluntly that "it would have been all
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very well to speak of arbitration if [the miners] had managed to hang up the
industry. But they had failed." Reyersbach thought that the "only trouble"
was that "3,000 men were out of work and that when they realised this
violence might be resorted to." Botha reminded the deputation that troops
could not be kept on the Rand indefinitely "without there being big trouble
on the other side of the water." But if they were withdrawn before the
dispute had ended, there was the likelihood that the strike would "become
worse." Above all, he feared that if the miners "were turned out of
employment permanently" they could become "a sort of canker in
Johannesburg." This was an outcome that neither state nor industry desired.
The Randlords, though feeling the costs of barricading their properties and
maintaining a large force of special constables, were prepared however to
concede little more at this stage than a vague promise to take back the
strikers as positions became vacant, Farrar adding pointedly that they "would
have to be absolutely fair to the new men they had taken on."
The TMA did not finally abandon its attempt to secure a pledge from the
government to mediate in the dispute until 10 July, when Whiteside, who had
been expected to introduce a motion in the Transvaal Legislative Assembly
condemning the mineowners* refusal to arbitrate, and requesting the
government to introduce legislation to deal with such disputes in the future,
amended his motion when the government indicated it could not support it in
its original form. All references to the strike were eliminated and the motion
was then carried unanimously. De Villiers announced that while the
government would carefully consider introducing legislation, this would have
no bearing on the current dispute. For the TMA, whose call for a general
strike to begin on 4 July—"Independence Day for all white workers in the
Transvaal"—had drawn no additional support for the movement, this betrayal
destroyed the last hope of compelling the mineowners to take the strikers
back on the latter's own terms.
By now, the miners were enduring great hardship. Those with savings
could leave the country; Reyersbach estimated that between 500 and 700
miners had done so. But for the majority, penury and hunger prevailed,
exacerbated by one of the coldest winters on record. The TMA established
camps for those evicted from their quarters, providing the miners with tents.
J.B. Robinson was rumoured to have donated a large sum to the strike
fund , but the TMA clearly had limited means to assist its members. On 3
June, the union put up a notice at its headquarters warning that "no one but
certified men need apply for assistance." This was directed at the many
unemployed urban Afrikaners who, believing themselves entitled to some
reward for agreeing not to act as strike-breakers, had sought relief from the
TMA. By 22 June, the union was using most of its funds to support the
families of 600 married men. A month later, shortly before the strike was
called off, James Coward, Chairman of the Germiston Strike Committee, informed
Smuts, Botha and de Villiers of a resolution passed by the strikers requesting
the government to repatriate them rather than that they should accept the
humiliating terms imposed by the managers. The men were "face to face with
starvation," their children "absolutely shoeless." The mineowners, he said,
were "grinding the men down to the lowest stage."
In this context of hardship and humiliation, with open remedial action
stifled by the state, a section of the miners turned to arson, sniping, and
waylaying of strike-breakers. Examples of the last had occurred since mid-
May, but the attacks became iflore premeditated after the troops arrived. In
one of the first incidents, on the evening of 28 May, a fire was discovered in
the single men's quarters of the Wemmer. A burning rag tied to a stick had
been thrown through the window of the room of two brothers, one of whom,
Bill Polgrane, had returned to work that day. Soon after, Polgrane received
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an anonymous letter threatening to "rid the country of such dirty underhand
curs as you," and left the Transvaal. On 2 June, a shift boss and mine
captain employed on the Treasury were returning from the Cleveland station
when five revolver shots were fired at them. At many mines workers were
afraid to go outside after dark. O'Brien reported rumours that some
strikers were planning "acts of violence in the shape of incendiarism," but he
was experiencing difficulty obtaining information as they had formed "Secret
Societies." The police suspected the TMA of sending spies to the mines to
discover the identity of strike-breakers; managers were warned to exercise
particular care in hiring workers. On 15 June, O'Brien learned that the
mineowners' residences might be attacked, and the next day an attempt was
made to burn down his own house; a dismissed policeman had plotted the deed
with some miners. Most ominous of all for the rulers were shipping
company returns showing that many more women and children had departed
for England than men, who remained behind to see the struggle through to
the end.120
With each week the incidents multiplied: murder and attempted murder;
threats to mine property; hotels dynamited; water pipes blown up; explosions
at the homes of strike-breakers. Mounted troops escorted workers to and
from the mines, and patrolled the working-class suburbs of Johannesburg.
The police made little headway in tracing the perpetrators, despite O'Brien's
having a "Confidential Intelligence Department working all along the Rand" to
infiltrate the movement. His only conclusion, a perennial explanation of
last resort for embattled officialdom, was that "the strikers include in their
ranks a large number of the criminal classes." This "dangerous element" of
"violent persons" comprised mainly "foreigners":
"Irish American, Italian and Austrian, and of the Australian *larrikin*
class, and curiously enough a certain number of young Africanders,
who, having once been induced to come out on strike are very
aggressive against their own people who are continuing to work."
The English miners, however, were quite as likely to number among the
"violent persons." By O'Brien's own reckoning, the hard core of the strikers
was fashioned from "North-country Englishmen," and it was these men and
their dependants that the government feared to see become "a sort of canker
in Johannesburg." But if the police were unable to discover its authors,
the underground campaign was equally unsuccessful in forcing the mineowners
to alter their terms, despite Reyersbach's private acknowledgment that the
stopes were "undoubtedly beginning to suffer" from being worked by "raw
hands."124
By the end of July, a resolution to the conflict was in view. The TMA
threatened to carry on by obtaining £3,000 from England, but it could not
support its destitute members for much longer. Botha and Smuts pledged
their assistance if the union called off the strike. The government could then
dispense with the troops, which were a political embarrassment and financial
burden. Managers were willing to employ experienced miners on the new
terms. Clearly the industry had least to lose in these somewhat obscure
negotiations, but then it had dictated the terms of the struggle from the
outset. Thus, the TMA agreed to call off the strike, while the Randlords
promised to take back all the miners, with the exception of the leaders, as
vacancies occurred. The leaders, it was said, probably would find work on
J.B. Robinson's mines. The government was soon able to withdraw the troops,
but it was months before all the miners found work. When the government
gave £2,000 to the TMA early in September "for relief of deserving cases," 800
were still unemployed. The South African Mines saw little harm in this
surplus. There was no room, it concluded complacently, for "indifferent
miners," either Afrikaners or erstwhile strikers:
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"Doubtless the best men will not long want for work. The very proper
competition among managers, who ... are anxious to secure the servi<
of the really good miners, cannot fail to quickly absorb that class."1
The last word, though, belongs to Tom Mathews of the TMA:
"It is not only the economics as laid down by Allen Smith [sicl which
is at stake ... if you hand us over to the Chamber of Mines and
that you can do nothing for us, to whom can we look for redress?"1
This plea to Botha during the strike served notice that it would not be many
years before the white miners would again challenge state and capital.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing account suggests a number of levels on which a reassessment
of the 1907 strike might proceed. Strikes are favoured subjects for historians
because, as instances of overt conflict, they promise to expose for analysis the
most salient trends and contradictions. The 1907 strike is no exception. Most
commonly it has been interpreted as a crushing victory for the mineowners.
Indeed, if the outcome is rendered in terms of a fall in working costs it
certainly was. The South African Mines later gloated that the "strike
movement enabled the mines to bring about a reorganization of wages in a few
months, which under normal circumstances would have taken years to
achieve." Some mines recorded falls of over 40 pence in the expenses per ton
of ore milled at the end of 1907 compared with the previous year. In
other respects, the battle was less conclusive. As Honnold pointed out to his
colleagues, there were two goals that the industry ideally hoped to achieve.
These declines in costs represented the attainment of the first, but the
second—a continued uniformity of control over the conditions of employment
for white labour—was much more difficult to reach. This ongoing struggle
brought out tensions between the smaller and the larger groups. The
pressures particularly on the smaller groups were ever likely to spark off a
conflict over irritating everyday work conditions that might spill over into a
strike involving the industry as a whole. Given the close supervision
exercised by mining capital over the minutiae of white working-class life, and
over civil society in general, these workplace struggles could proceed rapidly
to threaten the entire colonial social order. But once the conflict was over,
the smaller groups again were likely to be the first to buckle to the white
workers' attempts to claw back some of their wages and privileges. A less
linear conceptualization perhaps is needed of changes in labour organization
in these years than the literature suggests.
The strike also reveals aspects of white workers' experience that
deserve further study. In struggling to secure the solidarity of
constituencies fragmented along lines of ethnicity, language, occupation and
political affiliation, the striking workers were compelled to adopt a range of
contradictory ideological positions. As British subjects and volunteers they
hoped to enjoy greater liberties and win over the police and troops, to whom
they also appealed as "fellow-workers." They could show their anger towards
the mineowners and the British connection with the symbolism of July 4th.
To the strikebreakers and the new government they could be South Africans
claiming that their struggle against the mineowners was analogous to that of
the Boers in the war only recently concluded. To the white community at
large they could argue that they were defending "white civilisation," a
double-edged blade that their class enemies were greatly more adept at
wielding against themselves, as the episode with'othe Chinese in the early part
of the strike well illustrates.
In part such tactics were opportunistic, but they also reflect the
insecurities and fluidity of white working-class life and identity in this
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period. In 1907 most white miners were recent arrivals in South Africa, and
those who had even ten years' experience on the Rand had known several
governments, none of which could claim their unreserved loyalty. Formed as
miners during the phase of unprecedented international migration and
exploitation of raw materials feeding the second industrial revolution, many
had had experience in several countries with a variety of political complexions
and industrial conditions. These circumstances meant that they possessed an
extensive repertoire of political symbols that was both a strength to be drawn
upon in industrial conflict, and a weakness that had them juggling too many
ideological balls in a context in which local politics was equally fractured.
Many had families overseas to whom they fully expected to return; indeed, in
marked comparison with the later strikes, police and press reports mention
little about women's militancy in this conflict. It is true that many of the
workers who held out longest appear to have lived with their families on the
Rand, suggesting a connection between the strike and the stabilization of the
white work-force. Against this, however, we have to juxtapose the evidence
that a number of the most determined fighters sent their dependants out of
the country.
As noted at the outset, the strike most often has intrigued historians
as a valuable indicator in the development of the vexed relationship between
the state, capital, and white labour in early twentieth-century South Africa.
Although not incorrect in this respect, many studies, resting on an imperfect
empirical foundation, have tended to simplify the meaning of the episode in
ways that can be misleading. David Yudelman's work is a good instance of
this tendency, not least because, in a monograph that otherwise exemplifies
the value of careful primary research, he has constructed from secondary and
partial primary sources an inaccurate narrative that ironically leads him,
despite his own strictures on "turning-point theory," to construe the 1907
strike as symbolizing precisely such a turning point.
Yudelman draws a connection between the suppression of the strike and
the new government's urgent need to raise loan capital abroad. In support
of this, he positions in his argument information about the British
government's agreeing to guarantee a loan of £5 million in such a way as to
convey the impression that there was a causal link between breaking the
strike and obtaining the loan. The difficulty, however, is that Lord Elgin,
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had consented in principle at a
meeting with Botha on 29 April 1907 to guarantee the loan in exchange for the
Transvaal's meeting the Liberals on the repatriation of Chinese labour. Formal
notice of Treasury approval of the guarantee was sent to Botha on 4 May,
when the dispute was still confined to Knights Deep. At the meeting,
moreover, Botha had convinced Elgin that without this separate source of
finance he would be at the mercy of mining capital. Thus, the need for
capital, identified by Yudelman as the lever ("the Achilles' heel of the
fledgling Transvaal state") with which Smuts and Botha were moved by the
mineowners to comprehend the link between "the raising of finance capital and
the lowering of working costs on the mines," .and consequently to suppress
the strike, had been met before the conflict. This is not, of course, to
deny either that the Transvaal state had an interest (even a preponderant
interest) in fostering the mining industry, or that the behaviour of the
government in breaking the strike can usefully be interpreted in this context.
Nor does it imply that international financiers were not heartened by this
action, although it is not clear that an absence of strikes would not have
been a surer sign, from their perspective, of a stable investment climate. It
does suggest, however, that an adequate historical co n te x t uali zatio n of the
strike should take into account the role of the imperial power, and
concomitantly confront the continuities and disjunctions in the social order
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before and after 1907.
Yudelman, for a number of reasons, undervalues the British connection
and plays down the continuities. First, he implicitly takes issue with scholars
who have located the origins of the most characteristic and persistent South
African institutions and policies of rule in the years of intense British
intervention immediately following the South African War. By contrast, he
dates the beginnings of the formative dialogue between state and capital to
the withdrawal of direct British rule in 1907, arguing that this "marked more
than a mere change of government: it also marked a change in the form of the
state." Second, his principal sources, the papers of Smuts and Phillips,
cause him to overemphasize the significance of their individual rapprochement,
and to conclude that this preceded an as yet non-existent institutional
relationship. Third, his account presupposes that Smuts and Botha were
reluctant to accept the primacy of mining capital and its profitability
imperatives in the political economy; that they needed to be socialized into
seeing things this way; and that the events surrounding the 1907 strike
achieved precisely this. Fourth, for one concerned to demonstrate that
what is most important in recent South African history is not that which sets
it apart from, but rather that which makes it typical of, the history of modern
industrial states, Yudelman is surprisingly unreceptive to the contribution of
the leading capitalist power of the time. One can only speculate that he is
captive here to his idea that South Africa was more innovator than follower
in the development of state-capital relations, causing him to portray this
process as much more autochthonous than he could if he took full cognizance
of the British connection.
In construing 1907 as a turning point, Yudelman has been misled by the
nervous rhetoric of the mineowners between the ascendancy of the Liberals
at Westminster and the breaking of the strike. This is precisely the type of
rhetoric that he shows has seduced historians of later decades. Doubtless the
uncertainty was real, but there is no reason to assume that the change of
executive caused capital more concern in 1907 than it did in 1924, the centre-
piece of Yudelman's critique of turning-point theory. Yudelman maintains that
"with a little help from the state bureaucracy" the Pact government after 1924
came to understand the relationship between the state and mining capital much
as its predecessor had done. Likewise, in 1907, the British did not
bequeath a bureaucracy that was neutral in the imperatives to which it
responded, or in the worldview it promoted, but one geared to a given set of
assumptions about relations between state and industry, and between capital
and labour. In dealing with the strike, the new government was guided as
much by inherited officials such as O'Brien as it was by the exhortations of
individual mineowners. An institutional framework, in other words, was
already in place. It makes for absorbing drama, but not necessarily reliable
history, to plot the course of relations between state, capital and organized
labour through the correspondence of such powerful personalities as Smuts
and Phillips. Phillips's letters to his London principals certainly emphasized
his cultivation of good individual relations, but this need not mislead us.
Referring to the example of 1907, he later recommended approaching the Pact
in the same way. Yudelman, citing this advice, comments that the two
situations were not analogous because an impersonal relationship between the
state and mining capital, which had not existed in 1907, had been formalized
by 1924. If an institutional framework was already in place in 1907,
however, there is no need to claim that Phillips was in error.
Whatever rapprochement there was on a personal level between members
of the new government and the leading mineowners had been preceded by,
and presupposed, the policy of conciliation long advocated and then
implemented by Het Volk and the British Liberals. An interpretation of the
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1907 strike thus needs to replace Yudelman's triangle of state, capital and
white labour with a quadrangle adding the British government. The Liberal
settlement extended early responsible government to the Afrikaner leadership
in exchange for a loyalty to empire that implied continuity in the public
service and sympathetic treatment of the mining industry. Smuts and Botha,
reformers in the Kruger era, were well aware both of how a modern state
should function and of the power and importance of the mining industry, and
were content to abide by the rules of the settlement. The Liberals had no
wish to squander the gains of the South African War, but sought rather to
conserve them by pursuing an alternative strategy to that of their
Conservative opponents. Having undoubtedly taken a risk in this, they
had too much at stake to see it fail, which accounts for their willingness to
guarantee the loan, and for Churchill's comments on learning of the use of the
troops. The presence of these troops, which entered into both Conservative
and Liberal calculations, underlined the limited sovereignty of the Transvaal
state. During the 1913 strike, Lord Gladstone, the Union's first Governor-
General, concluded that the government was "not yet in a position to stand
alone in such a crisis." How much truer then was this in 1907 of the
Transvaal government, whose own coercive resources were so rapidly
overtaken by the strike. Botha and Smuts knew this well, and clearly
understood that they could in future emergencies again resort to the Imperial
troops, for even before the strike was quite over they had endorsed plans to
reduce the strength of the South African Constabulary to levels that Selborne
believed risked leaving "the arm of the Executive perilously weak."
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